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LAW, SOCIETY, AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 
LITIGATION IN JAPAN 
ERIC A. FELDMAN∗  
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Essay examines conflict over medical malpractice claims in Japan, 
and uses it as a lens through which to view the relationship between tort 
law and its social, economic, and political context. Allegations of medical 
malpractice in Japan have been rising rapidly. What explains the 
increasing willingness of people who believe that they are victims of 
medical malpractice to sue? And what (if anything) does the upswing in 
malpractice litigation suggest about the changing role and importance of 
the legal system in the lives of the Japanese people?  
The relationship between law and society in Japan has long been the 
source of scholarly speculation, and occasionally the topic of serious 
academic analysis.1 The two most widely held points of view are 
dramatically different. One suggests that “Japanese culture” (rarely 
defined but generally assumed to encompass social values, norms of 
behavior, and modes of interpersonal interaction) places a high premium 
on the preservation of social harmony and the avoidance of open conflict.2 
In that view, the language of law is subordinate to the power of social 
integration, and leads people to forego lawsuits. The other explanation for 
Japan’s low litigation rates posits a more structural cause, namely that the 
elite have created barriers to inhibit access to the legal system and limit the 
extent to which courts can be a potent force of social change.3 Among the 
 
 
 ∗ This Essay was originally published in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 
(David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds.) (forthcoming 2009) ((c) 2009 by the Board of Trustees of 
the Leland Stanford Jr. University, all rights reserved; by permission of the publisher, www.sup.org). 
The research and writing of this Essay was supported in part by a University of Pennsylvania Law 
School Faculty Summer Research Grant. I am grateful to Robert Leflar, Craig Martin, and Frank 
Upham for their comments on an earlier draft of this Essay; to Alison Stein for outstanding editorial 
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 1. Eric A. Feldman, Law, Culture, and Conflict: Dispute Resolution in Postwar Japan, in LAW 
IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 50 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 1997); Anthony Cole, Commercial Arbitration 
in Japan: Contributions to the Debate on Japanese “Non-Litigousness,” 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
29 (2007). 
 2. Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE 
LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41 (Arthur T. von Mehren ed., 1963). 
 3. John Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359, 373 (1978); 
FRANK UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 16 (1987). 
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most important of those barriers are constraints on the number of licensed 
attorneys, the imposition of high case filing fees, a slow and costly civil 
litigation process, and limited damage awards.4  
Medical malpractice litigation provides an ideal opportunity to 
reexamine these conflicting theories about the relationship between law 
and society in Japan. Over the past several decades, particularly the past 
ten years, medical malpractice lawsuits have increased rapidly.5 The 
numbers are small, but the rates of increase are not. From only 102 
malpractice claims filed in Japanese courts in 1970, the number escalated 
ten-fold to 1003 in 2003; in the decade between 1992 and 2002 claims 
grew by almost 150%, from 371 to 906.6 To what extent does this support 
the view that cultural constraints to litigation have softened over the past 
decades? Does it suggest that structural barriers previously inhibiting 
access to the formal legal system have been reconfigured?  
Unlike most analyses of litigation in Japan that examine its relative 
infrequency, this Essay focuses on the growing frequency of medical 
malpractice litigation and offers an explanation for its cause and 
consequences. It claims that more malpractice claims are reaching the 
courts for both cultural and structural reasons. First, formidable structural 
barriers to civil litigation have been softened, some that affect all civil 
cases and others specific to medical malpractice. The increasing size of the 
bar, for example, makes it easier for potential plaintiffs to find attorneys, 
and the creation of a new expert witness system expedites malpractice 
suits. Second, these structural changes have occurred in, and are 
intertwined with, a broader social and political climate that is increasingly 
fertile ground for the escalating rates of malpractice claiming. An overall 
decrease in the trust placed in medical elites, for example, and media 
coverage that highlights malfeasant doctors have created an atmosphere in 
which malpractice litigation is increasingly attractive. 
The consequence and broader significance of the rise in medical 
malpractice claims, although speculative, is far-reaching. The interaction 
of structural changes that facilitate the use of the courts with broader 
 
 
 4. Haley, supra note 3, at 378–89. 
 5. As claims have escalated, so too has the public discourse, with the media, medical and legal 
organizations, elected officials, bureaucrats, and others debating the cause of the escalation and what 
(if anything) should be done in response. See, e.g., Andrew Feld, Culture and Medical Malpractice: 
Lessons from Japan. Is the “Reluctant Plaintiff a Myth?, 101 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 1949–50 
(2006). 
 6. See SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, IJIKANKEISOSHŌ JIKEN NO SHINRYŌKAMOKUBETU KISAI 
KENSU [REPORT OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION COMMISSION (REPORT 4, NUMBER OF 
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES RESOLVED BY PRACTICE] (2005), http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/ 
about/iinkai/izikankei/toukei_04.html [hereinafter MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 4]. 
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socio-political changes that reinforce the attractiveness of litigation could 
well cause the number of medical malpractice lawsuits to continue to rise. 
Although that interaction is difficult to document, it is relatively easy to 
describe. The creation of specialized medical courts and the increasing 
availability of attorneys, for example, underscore the legitimacy of seeking 
legal advice and the acceptability of formalizing one’s grievances into 
lawsuits. As the demand for attorneys grows and more claims are filed, a 
greater number of lawyers will be attracted to medical malpractice as a 
field of expertise, and courts will accommodate the growing caseload.  
Further, the rise in medical malpractice claims highlights a significant 
departure from the government’s long-standing approach to the filing of 
tort-related claims, which had effectively shut the door to tort litigation. 
Potential litigants faced such daunting institutional barriers to suing that 
they had little choice but to resolve their claims through alternative 
channels. Ultimately, people came to prefer extra-judicial solutions to 
formal legal institutions. Now, through a number of loosely related 
reforms, the government is loosening and lessening the barriers to the 
courts by, for example, licensing additional lawyers, creating new court 
procedures that have led to shorter trials, streamlining the process for 
recruiting expert witnesses, and designating specialized courts to resolve 
medical malpractice lawsuits. Whereas a rise in the incidence of tort-based 
litigation was once a catalyst to the creation of alternative means of 
dispute resolution or administrative compensation systems, medical 
malpractice litigants are now promised a faster, more narrowly tailored 
legal process that makes suing increasingly attractive.7 What this shift 
demonstrates is a new legitimacy for litigation, and an increasingly 
important place for law in the lives of Japanese citizens. Such a claim is 
difficult to support empirically; the data and observations offered in this 
Essay outline the argument and begin to build the case. 
II. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN JAPAN: THE ESCALATION OF LITIGATION 
As indicated earlier, the frequency of medical malpractice litigation has 
changed dramatically over the past several decades. In 1970, only 102 new 
malpractice cases were filed in Japan. That number increased to 310 in 
1980, varied between 196 and 381 from 1980 to 1992, and then began to 
 
 
 7. CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & MARK D. WEST, ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN JAPAN: THE IMPACT OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL RULES 241 (2004) (observing 
“increased legalization” in Japanese corporate governance and noting that “[t]he role of lawyers in the 
Japanese economy, and in society generally, will continue to increase.”). 
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climb, reaching 795 new filings in 2000 and 1110 in 2004 before dropping 
slightly over the next two years.8 The backlog of malpractice cases also 
steadily rose from the early 1990s through 2004, leading to a growing 
concern about whether courts are able to resolve malpractice claims in a 
timely manner.9 And for the first time, in 2000 and 2001, more medical 
malpractice cases were resolved through litigation than court-supervised 
mediation, and in some instances plaintiffs had joined forces by 
aggregating their claims.10 Finally, the number of cases brought against 
government-owned or -operated hospitals also increased in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, a category of cases that directly affects the state’s 
financial well-being and reputation.11 Compared to the overall increase in 
the rate of civil litigation in Japan since the late 1980s—a rise of 
approximately twenty-nine percent in district court filings, the bulk of 
which involved bad loans and debt collection—the rise of medical 
malpractice litigation is dramatic.12 
TABLE 1: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS IN JAPAN, 1994–200613 
year new 
claims 
pending 
claims 
disposed 
claims 
percent 
settled 
(wakai) 
percent resulting 
in a judicial 
decision 
1992 371 1257 364 ----- ----- 
1993 442 1352 347 ----- ----- 
1994 506 1466 392 ------ ----- 
 
 
 8. See SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, IJIKANKEISOSHŌ JIKEN NO SHORIJYŌKYŌ OYOBI 
HEIKINSHINRIKIKAN [REPORT OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION COMMISSION] (2005), 
http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/about/iinkai/izikankei/toukei_01.html [hereinafter MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE REPORT 1]; MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 4, supra note 6; Kazue Nakajima et al., 
Medical Malpractice and Legal Resolution Systems in Japan, 285 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1632, 1632 
(2001). 
 9. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 1, supra note 8. Cases primarily involve internal medicine 
(approximately twenty-five percent of all cases), surgery (approximately twenty percent), and 
obstetrics (fifteen percent).  
 10. For example, over two dozen families of patients injured by heart operations at Tokyo 
Women’s Medical University Hospital created the Higaisha Renrakukai and filed both civil and 
criminal charges. Patients’ Families to Sue Hospital over Malpractice, DAILY YOMIURI, July 21, 2003. 
 11. Report: 32 Malpractice Suits Filed During 9-Month Period, DAILY YOMIURI, Jan. 11, 2003. 
 12. Tom Ginsburg & Glenn Hoetker, The Unreluctant Litigant? An Empirical Analysis of 
Japan’s Turn to Litigation, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 31, 56 (2006) (arguing that the relatively modest 
overall increase in litigation rates (compared to medical malpractice) since the 1980s is evidence of the 
importance of institutional, not cultural, barriers to litigation). 
 13. See SUPREME COURT OF JAPAN, REPORT OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION 
COMMISSION (2002), http://www.courts.go.jp/saikosai/about/iinkai/izikankei (last visited Mar. 14, 
2008) [hereinafter MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 3]. 
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year new 
claims 
pending 
claims 
disposed 
claims 
percent 
settled 
(wakai) 
percent resulting 
in a judicial 
decision 
1995 488 1528 426 46.5 40.4 
1996 575 1603 500 51.8 35.4 
1997 597 1673 527 52.8 36.6 
1998 632 1723 582 49.0 39.9 
1999 678 1832 569 46.9 40.4 
2000 795 1936 691 45.9 44.1 
2001 824 2038 722 44.0 46.3 
2002 906 2075 869 43.8 44.4 
2003 1003 2043 1035 49.1 39.2 
2004 1110 2149 1004 46.1 40.3 
2005 999 2086 1062 49.8 37.7 
2006 913 1860 1139 53.3 35.3 
 
Added to the increase in civil litigation, there has also been a rise in 
police reports alleging malpractice.14 Article 21 of the Medical Act (Ishi-
hō) imposes a duty on physicians to notify the police when they observe 
what they believe is a “suspicious” death.15 The exact criteria for what 
counts as “suspicious” are unclear, and a number of medical societies have 
struggled to define the types of cases that should trigger the reporting 
requirement. In April 2004, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in a widely 
reported case involving a hospital error and subsequent cover-up that 
challenged the reporting requirement as a violation of the right against 
self-incrimination.16 The Court affirmed the duty to report, but failed to 
clarify the types of cases that must be reported. The notoriety of that case 
drew attention to the rapid escalation of police reports, which went from 
21 cases in 1997, to 124 in 2000, to 248 in 2003.17 In short, the number of 
newly filed medical malpractice litigation cases has increased quickly in 
Japan, the backlog of pending cases is much larger than in the past, and 
deaths that may be the result of malpractice have a greater likelihood of 
being reported to the police. Along a number of important dimensions, the 
 
 
 14. For a discussion of the role of criminal law in medical malpractice litigation in Japan, see 
Robert B. Leflar & Futoshi Iwata, Medical Error As Reportable Event, As Tort, As Crime: A 
Transpacific Comparison, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 189, 219 (2005). 
 15. Kenichi Yoshida et al., New Investigative Organization Will Be Enacted for Potentially 
Therapeutic Deaths in Japan (2005) (unpublished paper, on file with author). 
 16. Okai v. Japan, 58 KEISHŪ 247 (Sup. Ct., Apr. 13, 2004). 
 17. Robert B. Leflar & Futoshi Iwata, supra note 14, at 219 fig.2. 
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relations between doctors and patients are more “legalized” than they were 
just a decade ago.18 The rapid rate of increase in medical malpractice 
litigation not only raises the possibility that medical malpractice litigation 
could continue unabated, but it also poses questions about why such 
litigation has become more common and how its increase should and 
could be managed. 
III. JAPAN’S LAW OF NEGLIGENCE, THE CIVIL LITIGATION SYSTEM, AND 
HOW THEY ARE CHANGING  
Those who believe that they have been injured as the result of a 
medical error can pursue a legal remedy under the substantive law of torts 
(fuhō kōi).19 Tort law in Japan, unlike the plethora of conflicting rules one 
finds in different states of the United States, is codified and national, and 
the basic legal principle underlying tort-related harms is stated in article 
709 of the Civil Code. Based on the nineteenth century German law of 
accidents, the article states that “A person who has intentionally or 
negligently infringed any right of others, or legally protected interest of 
others, shall be liable to compensate any damages resulting in 
consequence.”20 As in American tort law, the central elements of a 
malpractice claim brought under article 709 are the establishment of a duty 
of care (chūi gimu no teido), evidence that the duty was breached (ihan), a 
 
 
 18. In comparison to the United States, the incidence of medical malpractice litigation in Japan is 
modest. In 2002, there were approximately 250,000 physicians in Japan (out of a population of 127 
million)—159,131 working in hospitals and 90,443 in clinics—who received a total of 606,399,536 
outpatient office visits (an average of almost five annual visits per person), and made almost 14 
million hospital admissions. Kōsei Tōkei Yōran [Directory of Public Health Statutes] (2002), available 
at http://wwwdbtk.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/youran/data16k/2-47.xls. In the United States that same year, 
there were 853,000 physicians, a population of almost 290 million, 1,083,500,000 outpatient visits 
(3.74 annual visits per person) and close to 34 million hospital admissions. U.S. Census Bureau, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004–2005, at 7, 107, 109, 113 available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-04.html (follow hyperlinks under “2004” for 
“Section 1: Population” and “Section 3: Health and Nutrition”) (last visited Mar. 9, 2009). Based on 
that data, one might expect a malpractice rate in the United States two to four times higher than that in 
Japan. In fact, there were more malpractice cases filed in Philadelphia in 2000, 2001, and 2002 than in 
all of Japan. The Unified Judicial Sys. of Pa., Pennsylvania Medical Malpractice Case Filings: 2000–
2007, http://www.pacourts.us/Links/Media/MedicalMalpractice/ (follow the “Med Mal Filing 
Statewide 2000–2007” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 27, 2008).  
 19. Medical malpractice claims can be brought under tort or contract law, and frequently lawsuits 
include both claims. Ultimately, the legal question is identical—did the provider satisfy the duty of 
care, and, if not, did the provider’s breach cause the plaintiff’s injuries? See MARK RAMSEYER & 
MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 67–68 (1999). Practical differences 
include a three-year statute of limitations for tort claims versus ten years for contract claims, and 
differences in damage awards. 
 20. MINPŌ [CIVIL CODE], art. 709.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009] LAW, SOCIETY, AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN JAPAN 263 
 
 
 
 
causal link (inga kankei) between the breach and the harm, and damages 
(songai baishō). The crux of a malpractice case is generally the 
identification of the applicable standard of care, the determination of 
whether or not the defendant provider met the standard, and the analysis of 
the causal relationship between the defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s 
injuries. 
A great deal depends upon how the standard of care is defined, which 
party must bear the burden of proving to the court that the defendant did or 
did not exercise due care, and which party is required to show that the 
defendant’s actions did or did not cause the plaintiff’s harms. The standard 
of care in Japanese malpractice cases is determined with reference to 
national rather than local practice.21 With regard to the burden of proof 
(shōmei sekinin), Japanese courts treat medical malpractice just like other 
tort claims and require plaintiffs to prove the central elements of their 
allegations.22 As Japanese academic commentary on the burden of proof in 
malpractice claims uniformly asserts, the burden of proof falls on 
plaintiffs, and interviews with judges and malpractice attorneys confirm 
that plaintiffs are required to establish the prima facie elements of their 
claims. Only after they have done so must defendants argue that they met 
the standard of care, or that their actions did not cause the alleged harm.23 
 
 
 21. Kiichi Nishino, Iryō Suijyun to Iryō Kankō [Medical Standards and Medical Practice], in 
IRYŌ KAGO SOSHŪ HŌ [MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION] 109 (Ōta Yukio ed., 2000). 
 22. For a discussion of standards of proof in civil and common law jurisdictions, see Kevin M. 
Clermont, Standards of Proof in Japan and the United States, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 263, 264 (2004) 
(arguing that in civil cases Japanese courts require proof “to a high probability similar to beyond a 
reasonable doubt”). See also Yasuhei Taniguchi, The 1996 Code of Civil Procedure of Japan—A 
Procedure for the Coming Century?, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 767 (1997). Obtaining evidence in 
malpractice cases can be difficult. The Japan Medical Association has successfully fought a law that 
would give patients the right to see their medical records. The Medical Practioners Law (Ishi-hō) 
requires that physicians create and store charts, but only for five years, and it lacks sanctions for the 
alteration of patients’ records. In 2003, the Japanese Diet passed the Kojin Jyōhō Hogo ni Kansuru 
Hōritsu. Kojin Jyōhō Hogoni Kansuru Hōritsu [Personal Information Protection Law], Law No. 57 of 
2003. Although this law did not address the issue of access to medical records, the Ministry of Health, 
Labor, and Welfare (“MHLW”) issued interpretive guidelines that specified the conditions under 
which patients in government-operated medical facilities could access their medical records. See 
KŌSEIRŌDŌSHŌ, IRYŌ-KAIGO KANKEI JIGYŌSHA NI OKERU KOJIN JYŌHŌ NO TEKISETSUNA 
TORIATSUKAI NO TAME NO GAIDORAIN [GUIDELINES FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF PERSONAL 
INFORMATION BY EMPLOYEES OF MEDICAL AND ELDERLY CARE FACILITIES] (2004) [hereinafter 
KŌSEIRŌDŌSHŌ]. Many patients remain unable to access their records. 
 23. See, e.g., Yoshihisa Nomi, Medical Liability in Japanese Law, in MODERN TRENDS IN TORT 
LAW: DUTCH AND JAPANESE LAW COMPARED 29 (Ewoud Hondious ed., 1999) (describing how 
plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases “must prove that the doctor’s conduct fell below the level of the 
standard established by law”). For a different view, see RAMSEYER & NAKAZUTO, supra note 19, at 
67, who claim that “courts deliberately switch the burden” and impose it on tort defendants (rather 
than plaintiffs), who must demonstrate that they met the standard of care or that their actions did not 
cause the plaintiff’s harms. 
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In short, by requiring plaintiffs to bear the burden of proof in medical 
malpractice cases, Japanese courts effectively limit the number of 
malpractice claims that can succeed.  
In addition to the specific legal elements of tort malpractice cases, 
several long-standing features of the Japanese legal system have a 
significant bearing on the initiation and resolution of medical malpractice 
claims, and changes to some of those features appear to be a factor in the 
increasing prevalence of malpractice litigation. For many years, for 
example, the bar association regulated the compensation of attorneys in 
Japan. Although the association’s fee schedule has been formally 
abolished, it is still a reasonable guide, since many lawyers continue to bill 
clients in accordance with the guidelines.24 With the fee schedule formally 
eliminated (the bar association argued that it was a restraint on trade), 
attorneys are now free to impose contingency fees. Some have reduced 
their retainers and added a twenty percent contingency fee, but relatively 
few have abandoned up-front payments by plaintiffs for a flat thirty 
percent contingency fee arrangement. The ability to pursue malpractice 
claims less expensively is likely to increase the number of potential 
malpractice claimants. Its impact on attorneys is less clear. Shifting some 
of the financial risk of medical malpractice claims to attorneys may 
decrease their willingness to handle such cases. But it could also attract 
risk-taking attorneys who would not have otherwise worked in the tort law 
or malpractice area. 
In addition to a retainer, plaintiffs have long been required to pay a 
case filing fee (tesūryō) to the court. The fee is based on the amount of the 
claimed damages and is determined as described in Table 2.25 
 
 
 24. In malpractice (and other civil) cases, according to the guidelines, plaintiffs cover their 
attorney’s out-of-pocket costs and pay a retainer. For cases in which plaintiffs seek less than 
¥3,000,000, they pay a retainer of eight percent; between ¥3,000,000 and ¥30,000,000, the retainer is 
five percent; between ¥30,000,000 and ¥300,000,000, plaintiffs pay three percent; and over 
¥300,000,000, the fee is two percent. See JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS, INTRODUCTORY 
PAMPHLET 24 (2000), available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/img/jfba.pdf. In addition to 
the retainer, attorneys could (and often did) add a thirty percent premium to the fee, and if they won 
the case they would double the initial retainer. Id. 
 25. YOSHITAKA WADA & SHŌICHI MAEDA, IRYŌ FUNSŌ: MEDICARU KONFUREKUTO 
MANÉJIMENTO NO TEIAN [CONFLICT OVER MEDICAL TREATMENT: A PROPOSAL FOR MEDICAL 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT] 142 (2001). 
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TABLE 2: DETERMINATION OF CASE FILING FEE 
Damages Sought by Plaintiff Amount Paid to the Court 
Less than ¥300,000 ¥500 for each ¥50,000  
¥300,000 to ¥1 million ¥400 for each ¥50,000  
¥1 million to ¥3 million  ¥700 for each ¥100,000  
¥3 million to ¥10 million  ¥1000 for each ¥200,000  
¥10 million to ¥100 million  ¥1000 for each ¥250,000 
¥100 million to ¥1 billion  ¥3000 for each ¥1 million  
Over ¥1 billion  ¥10,000 for each ¥5 million  
 
The filing fee, along with the retainer, requires a significant investment 
by potential malpractice plaintiffs. This investment is particularly difficult 
for those who are young and of modest means, who are the most likely to 
sue over so-called “bad baby” cases—those involving a child born with a 
serious neurological, physical, or intellectual impairment. In the United 
States, such cases are particularly attractive to attorneys and often lead to 
generous jury awards. But in Japan, even though cases involving impaired 
newborns represent some of the highest court-awarded damages in the 
malpractice area,26 few such cases reach the courts because new parents, 
generally in their late twenties or early thirties, are unable to afford the 
approximately forty thousand dollars needed to initiate a one million 
dollar case. So far, only modest changes have been made to the filing fee 
requirement, and it remains a disincentive to litigation. 
Likewise, the determination of civil damages in Japan also suppresses 
litigation. There are no juries in civil cases, which eliminates at least some 
of the uncertainty experienced by parties to medical malpractice claims in 
the United States.27 Moreover, damage calculations by Japanese courts 
result in awards that are both modest and predictable.28 No punitive 
damages are permitted in Japan, and cases that might lead to such damages 
 
 
 26. The initial payments in malpractice cases steadily decrease as a plaintiff’s age increases, a 
function of the decrease in damages requested. Id. at 143. For plaintiffs ages 0–19, the average sum of 
attorney retainer and filing fees is ¥3,149,119; from ages 20–39, ¥2,297,272; for those 40–59, 
¥2,280,118; and for those 60–79 years old, ¥1,876,676. Id. 
 27. For a discussion of the predictability of Japanese courts, see Mark J. Ramseyer, Reluctant 
Litigant Revisited: Rationality and Disputes in Japan, 12 J. JAPENESE STUD. 111, 114 (1988). For an 
analysis of using juries in malpractice cases, see Yoshihani Kawabata, Shimin no Shihō no Jitsugen no 
tame hi-Hōsō-Ichigen, Bai-Sanshin Seido to Kokumin Shuken [The Realization of Citizen’s Justice—
Common Training of Legal Profession, Jury System and Lay Judge System, and Popular Sovereignty], 
5 GAKUJUTSU NO DōKō 27, 30–31 (2000). 
 28. Leflar & Iwata, supra note 14, at 200. 
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in the United States are generally handled by the Japanese criminal law.29 
Compensatory damages as well as payments for pain and suffering in 
medical malpractice closely follow those for personal injuries that result 
from automobile accidents. Both types of damages are determined with 
reference to what is colloquially known as the “Red Book,” a bright red 
guide to traffic accident harms published annually by one of Tokyo’s 
lawyers’ associations.30 The Red Book contains hundreds of traffic 
accident diagrams that help courts and insurance adjusters evaluate the 
cause of and responsibility for particular types of crashes, as well as 
actuarial tables that provide guidelines and illustrations for the calculation 
of damages. They include “active” damages (sekkyoku songai), such as the 
cost of hospitalization, massage therapy, visits to hot springs, and the like, 
and “passive” damages (shōkyoku songai), which refer to losses like 
missed salary.31 The Red Book also offers a relatively simple approach to 
pain and suffering damages (isharyo), providing a matrix that takes into 
account the type of injury; the length of hospitalization; as well as the age, 
gender, and wage-earning status of the plaintiff, among other factors.32 
Unlike the individualized and highly variable pain and suffering damages 
in U.S. tort litigation, in Japan the reliance on a standard set of factors 
leads to a modest variance between the lowest and highest payments.  
As a result, plaintiffs’ demands for damages are likely to approximate 
those suggested by the Red Book. Damages in medical malpractice cases 
in Japan are thus more predictable and more modest than in the United 
States. As a result, plaintiffs are reluctant to invest in significant retainers 
and filing fees when winning their case leads to a limited payout, perhaps 
one they could have negotiated outside of court. 
Another structural factor that contributes to the increase in malpractice 
litigation is the growing number of attorneys willing to take malpractice 
cases. In part, the availability of attorneys is a consequence of the 
contraction of other types of legal work in the 1990s, particularly real 
estate, which kept many solo practitioners busy during the economic boom 
of the 1980s. Additionally, a generation of lawyers who came of age 
during the 1960s and embraced medical malpractice work as part of a 
 
 
 29. For a thorough discussion of the criminal law approach to medical malpractice in Japan, see 
generally id. 
 30. TOKYO SAN BENGOSHIGAI KŌTSŪ JIKO SHORI IINKAI [TOKYO’S THREE BAR ASSOCIATIONS 
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT COMM.], MINJI KŌTSŪ JIKO SOSHŌ SONGAI BAISHŌGAKU SANNTEI KIJYUN [CIVIL 
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT LITIGATION] (2001). 
 31. Id. at 1–56. 
 32. Id. at 57–72. 
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belief in patients’ rights has reached full maturity.33 That generation has 
successfully passed on its commitment to representing plaintiffs in 
malpractice cases to an increasing number of younger attorneys, some of 
whom now have their own practices, and some of whom work in firms but 
do pro bono work on behalf of the victims of medical accidents.34 In fact, 
there appears to be a correlation between the increase in the total number 
of attorneys in Japan and rising rates of medical malpractice claims. As 
demonstrated in Table 3, the number of attorneys in Japan has been 
steadily increasing since 1960, and between 1990 and 2005 the lawyer 
population increased more than fifty percent, whereas the overall 
population grew by less than five percent. 
TABLE 3: NUMBER OF LICENSED ATTORNEYS AND TOTAL POPULATION OF 
JAPAN35 
Year  Attorneys Population of Japan 
1960 6,321 94,301,623
1965 7,082 99,209,137
1970 8,478 104,665,171
1975 10,115 111,939,643
1980 11,441 117,060,396
1985 12,604 121,048,923
1990 13,800 123,611,167
1995 15,108 125,570,246
2000 17,126 126,925,843
2005 21,185 127,760,000
 
Even more dramatic is the increase in the number of women licensed to 
practice law, shown in Table 4. Not only do they often find it difficult or 
unattractive to work in traditional firms, but for some, medical malpractice 
 
 
 33. Eric A. Feldman, Patients’ Rights, Citizen’s Movements, and Japanese Legal Culture, in 
COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES 227 (David Nelkin ed., 1997). 
 34. Leflar & Iwata, supra note 14, at 202 n.46. 
 35. See JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 24; MINISTRY OF INTERNAL 
AFFAIRS & COMMUNC’NS, FINAL REPORT OF THE 2000 POPULATION CENSUS, available at 
http://www.stat.go.jp/English/data/kokusei/2000/final/hyodai.htm (follow hyperlinks for “Statistical 
Table List,” then “Statistical tables presented in the report,” then “Population, Population Change, 
Area and Population Density of Japan: 1920 to 2000”) (last visited Oct. 28, 2008); MINISTRY OF 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS & COMMC’NS., INTERCENSAL ADJUSTMENT OF CURRENT POPULATION ESTIMATES 
(2000–2005), available at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/jinsui/2-3.htm (follow “II Statistical 
Tables” hyperlink; then follow “Population by Sex for Japan—Total population, Japanese population 
(as of the First Day of Each Month)” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 18, 2009). 
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has a special appeal. Women are generally the primary care givers in 
Japanese households and are more likely to have frequent (and potentially 
negative) interactions with the health care system. This reality may lead 
them to make medical malpractice their professional focus.36  
TABLE 4: NUMBER OF LICENSED FEMALE ATTORNEYS IN JAPAN37 
Year  Female Attorneys 
1960 42
1965 79
1970 179
1975 299
1980 420
1985 587
1990 766
1995 996
2000 1,530
2005 2,648
 
In a variety of ways, therefore, the structure of the Japanese legal 
profession and the substance of Japanese tort law affect the frequency and 
outcomes of malpractice lawsuits.38 Although none of the factors 
described above are targeted specifically at medical malpractice litigation, 
each of them has an impact on malpractice lawsuits, and certain recent 
changes to them appear to be altering both the rate of malpractice filings 
and how they are resolved. 
IV. REFORMING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION: THE PACE AND 
ACCURACY OF JUSTICE 
Of equal or perhaps greater importance, several structural changes were 
recently implemented that are aimed directly at two issues of particular 
importance to medical malpractice litigants—the length of time it takes for 
claims to be resolved, and the accuracy of court judgments that deal with 
 
 
 36. Another group that may become central to malpractice litigation in Japan is physicians who 
matriculate at one of Japan’s new postgraduate law schools. At one school (Omiya Law School) ten of 
eighty first year students in 2004 had medical degrees. Attorneys with specialized medical knowledge 
are likely to be attracted to legal practices that build on their unique skills. 
 37. See JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 24. 
 38. Demographic changes may also play a role, and it is possible that elderly individuals with 
time and money are more likely to sue.  
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technical scientific and medical issues. William Gladstone’s maxim that 
“justice delayed is justice denied” has particular salience in Japan. The 
languid pace of trials, in which cases are scheduled to be heard 
discontinuously (e.g., one day each month) rather than from start to finish, 
has long been identified as one reason why Japanese plaintiffs find 
litigation an unsatisfying approach to conflict resolution. Justice officials 
and others involved in Japan’s legal reform activities, acutely aware of 
such concerns, made the acceleration of court proceedings a reform 
priority. But speed has the potential to work against accuracy, particularly 
in cases that require detailed scientific or medical knowledge. It is perhaps 
not surprising, therefore, that two recent changes bearing directly on 
medical malpractice, the development of a new system for calling expert 
witnesses and the creation of specialized medical courts, are targeted at 
speeding up malpractice trials and ensuring that judgments in such cases 
are as accurate as possible.  
Data on the pace of civil justice underscore the view that the 
infrequency of medical malpractice litigation might in part be the result of 
the length of time it takes courts to resolve malpractice claims. As 
illustrated in Table 5, between 1994 and 2006 such claims took far longer 
to resolve than other civil claims. Although the pace of resolving both 
malpractice and non-malpractice claims has increased over that period—
dramatically so in the case of malpractice—in 2006 it still took an average 
of 25.1 months for the average malpractice case to move from filing to 
final judgment in the district courts (the first-resort trial court for such 
cases), and far longer for appealed cases.  
TABLE 5: LENGTH OF TIME BETWEEN THE FILING AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
OF MALPRACTICE CASES AND CIVIL CASES IN DISTRICT COURTS,  
1994–2006 (IN MONTHS)39 
Year Medical Malpractice Cases All Civil Cases 
1994 41.4 9.8
1995 38.8 10.1
1996 37.0 10.2
1997 36.3 10.0
1998 35.1 9.3
1999 34.5 9.2
2000 35.6 8.8
 
 
 39. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 1, supra note 5. 
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Year Medical Malpractice Cases All Civil Cases 
2001 32.6 8.5
2002 30.9 8.3
2003 27.7 8.2
2004 27.3 8.3
2005 26.9 8.4
2006 25.1 7.8
 
The fact that a typical malpractice case takes more than three times 
longer than a civil case to be resolved increasingly came to be seen as an 
unfair barrier to malpractice litigants. Indeed, the government’s Justice 
System Reform Council, which has since 1999 been at the forefront of 
reforming Japan’s legal system to make it more accessible to its citizens, 
has taken a particular interest in accelerating the pace of civil claims 
generally, and malpractice specifically. In its politically influential 2001 
report, it advocated the implementation of a variety of changes that would 
improve the processing of civil claims and cut in half the amount of time it 
takes to resolve medical malpractice conflicts. Two significant reforms 
have taken aim at those goals: the creation of a new type of expert witness 
system and the establishment of specialized courts.40 
A. Reforming the Expert Witness System 
Japan’s expert witness system, similar to those of France and Germany, 
is set out in article 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure.41 The primary 
function of experts in Japan is to serve the court, generally consisting of a 
panel of three judges. Parties may also hire their own experts. Experts are 
generally identified as predisposed toward plaintiffs or defendants, and in 
Japan many more are available to defendants. 
Until recently, in malpractice and other claims, parties who believed 
that they needed expert testimony submitted a motion to the court, and if 
the presiding judge agreed, the court would contact the appropriate 
experts.42 It took on average 133.3 days for an expert to be successfully 
 
 
 40. JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM 
COUNCIL: FOR A JUSTICE SYSTEM TO SUPPORT JAPAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2001), available at 
www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html. 
 41. In France and Germany, judges can select individuals from a list of possible experts that is 
assembled annually by the court; no such list exists in Japan. 
 42. Between 1989 and 1998, experts were used in 22.5% of medical malpractice cases, and the 
plaintiffs’ chances of prevailing in malpractice litigation involving experts increased from 29.9% to 
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recruited, a delay that resulted in part from the lack of a single, simple 
procedure for expert identification. Courts sometimes asked medical 
societies or academic medical departments for recommendations, but 
doing so was generally a ten-month process.43 Parties could submit a list 
of potential experts to the court, but the opposing party was allowed to vet 
them, which was time consuming. Moreover, as a result of medical 
hierarchy and paternalism many experts, once identified, refused to advise 
courts on medical issues.44 Senior physicians occupy the top of carefully 
crafted pyramids of power, and classmates, members of the same 
professional organizations, co-workers, and others with professional or 
personal ties were reluctant to get involved in cases that may make them 
adversaries. Financial considerations rarely offered a sufficient incentive 
to overcome such reluctance. The cost of expertise varied with the 
complexity of a case, but was generally between three hundred thousand 
and five hundred thousand yen, and almost never over one million yen.45 
Once a court secured the participation of an expert, the fee was paid to the 
court by the party that initially requested expert involvement (though this 
fee was ultimately paid by the losing party). 
After experts agreed to serve and take an oath, the court provided them 
with pleadings and other relevant legal and medical documents, and 
requested either a written or (less frequently) oral report. Parties could 
submit written questions and seek clarification of written reports. They 
could also cross-examine experts who gave their reports orally. Experts 
who provided false testimony were subject to imprisonment for up to ten 
years.46 
1. The “Conference” Approach  
On January 8, 2003, the Tokyo District Court invited three physicians 
to discuss the merits of a malpractice claim involving a patient who 
 
 
39.1%. Noriko Sakamoto et al., The Use of Experts in Medical Malpractice Litigation in Japan, 42 
MED. SCI. L. 200, 202 (2002). 
 43. Ayuma Murata, Kantei ni tsuite [On Expert Opinion], 1023 HANREI TIMES, Apr. 2000, at 18; 
Tokyo district court practice dai-ichi committee, Kantel Jikō no Kettei Nado ni Muketa [Committee on 
Standardizing Expert Opinions], 1018 HANREI TIMES, Mar. 2000, at 39. 
 44. Sakamoto et al., supra note 42, at 201. 
 45. Tokyo Chihō Saibansho Iryō Soshō Taisaku Iinkai [Tokyo Dist. Court Med. Malpractice 
Comm.], Tokyo Chisai Iryō Shūchūbu ni Okeru Iryō Soshō no Shinri Jijyō ni Tsuite [Circumstances of 
the Medical Malpractice Trial in the Tokyo District Court Medical Malpractice Consolidation 
Division], 1105 HANREI TIMES, Jan. 1, 2003, at 43 [hereinafter Circumstances of Medical Malpractice 
Trial]. 
 46. KEIHŌ [PENAL CODE], art. 171. 
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underwent a jaw operation and died of heart failure.47 The architects of this 
new “conference” method (tōron hōshiki ni yoru kantei) of consulting 
medical experts cite several advantages over the current system, including 
convenience (experts may convene via closed circuit television rather than 
traveling to the courthouse),48 speed (experts will have only two months to 
review medical charts and conferences are limited to a single day),49 and 
objectivity (bringing several experts together may reduce their tendency to 
defend the actions of other medical providers). In addition, experts prepare 
only a single page of notes prior to a conference, making it much more 
difficult for the parties to offer a detailed (and potentially aggressive) 
rebuttal. For those who avoid serving as expert witnesses because they do 
not want to be subjected to withering cross-examination, the new system 
should provide some welcome relief.50  
2. Expert Commissioners 
The most innovative and controversial reform involving experts is the 
creation of a group of special court advisors. As stated by the Judicial 
System Reform Council, “study should be given . . . to the manner in 
which new systems for expert participation in litigation should be 
introduced, in which non-lawyer experts in each specialized field become 
involved in all or part of trials, from the standpoint of their own 
specialized expertise, as expert commissioners (senmon iin) to support 
judges.”51 Such experts will be called directly by the court and will assist 
in identifying and analyzing disputed issues, facilitating settlement, 
rendering opinions on technical issues, and evaluating evidence, among 
other functions. In contrast to traditional expert witnesses, expert 
commissioners will work exclusively as advisors to the court, and their 
opinions will not be considered formal evidence at trial. For this new 
system to succeed, it will have to overcome the view held by some 
 
 
 47. Ishi 3-nin, Touron Houshiki de Kantei [With Three Physicians, a Conference Method of 
Experts], ASAHI SHINBUN, Jan. 8, 2003. As of November 2003, the Tokyo District Court has only used 
the conference method on four occasions. 
 48. Karute Kantei Nado TV Kaigi De, NIKKEI SHINBUN, Apr. 18, 2002. 
 49. In the current system, a single expert may take many months, or even a year, to render an 
opinion. 
 50. See Noriko Yamamoto, Slow Malpractice Suits Under the Knife, MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Mar. 
20, 2000. Under recent amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, experts first present their views, 
followed by questions from the judge, then the party requesting an expert has the floor, and lastly the 
other party speaks. 
 51. American courts have also experimented with scientific advisors. Robert L. Rabin, 
Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000).  
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members of the plaintiff’s bar that physicians and other medical experts 
will almost inevitably internalize a pro-defense bias. Otherwise, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys are likely to oppose any form of expert involvement in medical 
malpractice cases that does not depend upon their explicit approval of 
every expert involved in a case.  
B. Creating Specialized Medical Malpractice Courts 
In addition to the focus on how outside experts can assist courts, 
simultaneous efforts have aimed to help sitting judges understand and 
assess the input of experts. Most civil cases are randomly assigned. The 
Tokyo District Court, for example, has fifty divisions, each staffed by a 
panel of three judges. Filed cases are assigned to a division, which is 
responsible for the case until it settles or is tried. Instead of randomly 
assigning medical malpractice cases, several of Japan’s most important 
courts—including the district courts in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, and 
Chiba—have recently created “consolidation divisions” (shūchūbu) that 
specialize in malpractice claims.52 Since 2001, for example, four of the 
fifty divisions of the Tokyo District Court have been assigned all of the 
malpractice cases filed (approximately two hundred). The hope is that 
judges in those divisions will acquire expertise that will better enable them 
to handle technical medical issues.53 Thus, in some cases judges will have 
the ability to identify and engage with experts on their own, and in other 
cases they will be able to use their acquired expertise to comprehend and 
decide malpractice claims.  
An analysis of the Tokyo District Court’s shūchūbu that looks at 228 
cases disposed of after October 1, 2002, shows that 36% (82 cases) were 
decided by the court’s specialized judges, and 127 (55.7%) were settled 
through mediation.54 Of the 228 cases decided by a judge, plaintiffs won 
40.2% (82 of 228) and lost 59.8% (49 of 228).55 Moreover, cases handled 
 
 
 52. Such divisions have been endorsed by the Judicial System Reform Council, as well as by 
attorneys who specialize in medical malpractice. See Tatsuo Kuroyanagi, Senmon Soshō no Kantei ni 
Tsuite [Appraisal in the Special Litigation], 120 HŌ NO SHIHAI 83 (2001); Manabu Yamana & Hiroshi 
Ōshima, [Current Trends in Medical Malpractice Litigation], 54(2) JIYŪ TO SEIGI 14–21 (2003). For a 
detailed discussion of consolidation bureaus, see Circumstances of Medical Malpractice Trial, supra 
note 45.  
 53. Judges are regularly rotated; few postings last more than five years, and many are for only 
three. To acquire a useful degree of medical expertise and use it in medical cases, judges will probably 
need more time than is possible under the current system of judicial administration.  
 54. Yuri Kamata, Tetsuya Yamada & Takaitsu Ogawa, Tokyo Chisai Iryō Shūchūbu ni Okeni 
Jiken no Gaikyō [An Analysis of Cases Handled by the Tokyo District Court’s Medical Malpractice 
Consolidation Division], 213 MINJIHŌ JŌHŌ 17 (2004). 
 55. Yamamoto, supra note 50. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
274 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 8:257 
 
 
 
 
by the medical court appear to proceed far more rapidly than malpractice 
cases channeled through the regular court system, with 35% of them 
disposed of within one year; the average case takes less than 17 months, 
making the medical court 10 months faster than the national average.56 
Each of the four specialized medical divisions receives an average of three 
to five new cases each month. 
TABLE 6: TOKYO DISTRICT COURT, SPECIALIZED MEDICAL COURT 
(SHŪCHŪBU), 2001-200757 
Year New Claims Pending Claims Disposed Claims
2001 126 162 22
2002 192 256 98
2003 180 262 164
2004 218 334 154
2005 195 337 191
2006 194 294 238
2007 201 280 215
 
Despite the effort to facilitate the involvement of experts in malpractice 
cases and create specialized medical courts, some judges and 
commentators argue that courts should decide a wide array of such cases 
without consulting experts.58 Judge Fukuda Takahisa of the Tokyo District 
Court, for example, points out that the internet has enabled individuals to 
learn a great deal about medical issues and notes that expert opinions 
almost always conflict. Consequently, he believes that judges should be 
proactive in learning about medical issues and trust their own judgment.59 
Suzuki Toshihiro, a prominent plaintiff’s attorney, agrees that attorneys 
and judges can often rely on their own understanding of the medical issues 
when determining whether malpractice occurred.60 In short, at the same 
time that specialized courts have become operational and judges are 
working to facilitate the participation of experts in medical cases, some 
 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Cases were accepted by the Specialized Medical Court beginning in April 2001. Special 
Medical Court Data: 2004–2007 (provided by Judge Keiko Mitsuyoshi) (on file with author).  
 58. Yamana & Ōshima, supra note 52. 
 59. Hirogaru, ‘Kantei Hanare,’ MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Apr. 16, 2002, at 3. 
 60. Id. 
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influential legal elites are claiming that such expertise is overrated and 
should play a less prominent role in medical malpractice cases. 
V. EXOGENOUS INFLUENCES ON THE RISE OF MALPRACTICE LAWSUITS 
In addition to the structural aspects of the civil litigation system that 
have affected malpractice, a set of factors exogenous to the legal system is 
particularly relevant to the rise in malpractice claims. First, the increasing 
number of people who are taking their medical providers to court is at 
least in part a result of the erosion of public trust in elites generally and 
physicians in particular. Public opinion surveys on such matters can be 
unreliable, but the available data support the conclusion that public trust in 
doctors has been declining. When a 1978 survey by the Yomiuri Shimbun 
newspaper, for example, asked patients about their level of trust in 
doctors, 21% said that they had a high level of trust and 68.2% said that 
they had a moderate degree of trust, with only 6.8% expressing some 
distrust and 0.8% saying that they do not trust doctors at all.61 A decade 
later, in 1988, a survey by the Asahi Shimbun newspaper found that 21% 
of people responded positively to the statement “I don’t really trust my 
doctor” (amari shinrai shiteinai); that number dropped to 20% in 1992, 
increased to 28% in 1996 and to 30% in 2000, and settled at 26% in 
2002.62 This trend was underscored by a 2003 Yomiuri Shimbun survey of 
3,000 people showing that 77% were very or somewhat anxious about 
being the victim of medical malpractice. Overall, the surveys reveal a 
gradual but clear decrease in trust and increase in distrust that is 
particularly dramatic among those between the ages of 20 and 40.  
Hospital administrators have gotten the message and have been 
experimenting with different ways of regaining the allegiance of patients. 
Some, like Shizuoka Prefecture’s Seirei Hamamatsu General Hospital, 
have started to talk about patients as “customers,” and have begun to offer 
services that until recently would have been unthinkable.63 Seirei 
Hamamatsu employs several doorwomen to greet patients, open their car 
 
 
 61. Naikakutu seitu kōhō shitsu [Government IR Department Cabinet Ministry], Iryō ni Kansuru 
Yoron Chōsa [Poll on Medical Treatment], http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/s47/S48-02-47-15.html (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2009). 
 62. Akiko Nakamura, Zenkoku Yoron Chōsa Shōhō: Isha wo Shinrai Rokuwari Jyūni Nenkan de 
Jiwajiwa Teika [Detailed Report of the National Public Opinion Survey], 147 ASAHI SOKEN REPŌTO 
82, (2000) (1988, 1992, 1996, and 2000 data); Zenkoku Yoron Chōsa Shōhō [Detailed Report of the 
National Public Opinion Survey], 156 ASAHI SŌKEN REPŌTO 170 (2002) (2002 data). 
 63. Mami Tsukahara, Hospitals Trying to Overcome Distrust, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 11, 2004. 
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doors, and treat them as if they were entering a luxury hotel.64 To some 
extent, the erosion of trust has been fueled by the media and its intensive 
coverage of providers who have engaged in outrageous conduct 
(subjecting the wrong patients to high-risk procedures, altering medical 
records to cover-up evidence of mistakes, etc.), triggering public criticism 
of the medical system.65 From this perspective, increases in malpractice 
litigation reflect a change in how people regard medical practitioners, and 
elites more generally, who are no longer perceived to be atop a rigid social 
hierarchy that makes them immune from legal attack. 
Second, the financial needs of victims may be growing because of a 
retrenchment in benefits offered through national health care and other 
parts of the social welfare system. With higher co-pays resulting in higher 
out-of-pocket health care costs, those with injuries that they believe were 
caused by negligent medical care may be more likely to sue in order to 
recoup their expenses. This tendency was exacerbated by Japan’s “lost 
decade” of economic stagnation in the 1990s; people were being asked to 
bear greater health care costs at a time when they had less money than they 
did ten years earlier.66 
Third, as briefly mentioned earlier, media coverage of medical 
malpractice litigation has brought public attention to suing doctors. Both 
lawyers and patients, as well as judges, government officials, and others, 
are influenced by the media. In the late 1990s, media coverage of 
malpractice cases soared. A database that tracks stories in Japan’s leading 
newspapers indicates that in 1990 there were only 161 stories about 
malpractice; that number jumped to 413 in 1997, 1258 in 1999, and 
between 2000 and 3000 per year since.67 The increase was marked by a 
large number of stories written about a number of now-notorious medical 
mishaps, like a mix-up involving two patients who received the wrong 
surgery (the lung patient received heart surgery, and vice versa), and the 
cover-up of a mistake involving a faulty artificial heart-lung machine.68 In 
addition, litigation brought by hemophiliacs against both the Ministry of 
Health, Labor and Welfare (“MHLW”) and pharmaceutical companies in 
the 1990s created a political scandal that was widely viewed as an example 
of how innocent and helpless people are mistreated at the hands of the 
 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Leflar & Iwata, supra note 14, at 197. 
 66. Interview with Kuroyanagi Tatsuo in Tokyo, Japan (July 2005) (on file with author). 
 67. Yasushi Kodama, Iryō anzen: How Safe is Safe Enough?, 1339 JURISUTO 67, 73 fig.2 (2007). 
 68. Yoshiharu Kawabata, Health-Related Litigation in Japan (Apr. 28, 2006) (unpublished paper 
presented at the Dickinson College Symposium on Health, Law and Justice in Asia). 
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medical establishment (and was instrumental to the success of the lawsuit 
and settlement of hepatitis C claims in 2007).69 Such stories depict medical 
malpractice litigation as a morally just cause, not the impecunious 
scheming of greedy parties, and pique the interest of the general public as 
well as attorneys and potential claimants.  
Interestingly, at least from the American perspective, criticism of 
overly generous awards to plaintiffs, spiraling insurance premiums, greedy 
plaintiff’s attorneys, or increases in claims that lead to undeserving 
lawsuits are virtually unknown in Japan. When an official publicly voiced 
such sentiments—like when a Deputy Minister at MHLW exclaimed that 
there are “growing numbers of money hungry weirdoes trying to get rich 
by blaming the medical world”70—the outburst led to demands for his 
resignation, not a groundswell of support. According to media accounts, 
the rising rate of malpractice claims reflects a growing number of medical 
accidents, not illegitimate lawsuits, insurance company gauging, or 
ambulance-chasing attorneys.71 
 
 
 69. Eric A. Feldman, Blood Justice: Courts, Conflict, and Compensation in Japan, France, and 
the United States, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 651, 682 (2000). 
 70. Malpractice Victims Demand Vice-Minister’s Dismissal, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Apr. 29, 
2003. 
 71. Regulators have undertaken a number of initiatives targeted at reducing the frequency of 
medical errors. Officials have created a mandatory accident reporting system, for example, that is 
managed by the Japan Council for Quality Health Care (“JCQHC”). Japan Council for Quality Health 
Care 2005, http://jcghc.or.jp/html/English/about_jcqhc.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2007). The Japan 
Board of Medical Societies has also set up a reporting system and is developing guidelines for 
disciplining doctors who have been convicted in criminal malpractice cases. Specialists Group to 
Tackle Malpractice, DAILY YOMIURI, Mar. 23, 2005. The government has sought to eliminate poorly 
performing doctors by beefing up the Medical Ethics Council, a ten-member group dominated by 
doctors and former Ministry bureaucrats. The Council’s narrow mandate only allows it to discipline 
physicians (a) charged with professional negligence that results in death, (b) convicted of a criminal 
offense, or (c) who misappropriate funds by fraudulently submitting claims for government 
reimbursement. Since 1971, it has revoked only sixty licenses, none due to malpractice. To improve 
the Council’s performance, the Ministry has charged it with meeting four times per year (rather than 
two), and has appointed new members trained in law and journalism. Menkyo Torikeshi [Invalidating 
Licenses], MAINICHI SHIMBUN, June 26, 2003. Finally, various efforts are underway to improve the 
performance of physicians. The Japan Board of Medical Specialties announced in early 2005 that it 
was considering the creation of a licensing system that would be linked to the reporting of medical 
accidents. The MHLW is considering a revision to the Medical Practitioner’s Law (Ishi-hō) that would 
require the retraining of physicians who commit medical errors. Health Ministry Plans to Retrain 
Incompetent Docs, DAILY YOMIURI, Feb. 21, 2005. Similarly, the Japan Medical Association is 
requiring providers who have been the subject of more than three medical malpractice complaints to 
undergo retraining. Todōfuke Ishikai Ijifunsō tantō riji jijōsayōkasseikatantōriji Gōdō renrakukaigi ryō 
to shitsu no kōjō ni muke, kakki teki na ketsudan [Joint Meeting of Directors of Prefectual Medical 
Associations in Charge of Medical Malpractice Conflict and Directors in Charge of Self-Cleaning 
Activation Made a Landmark Decision to Improve the Quality of Medical Care], NICHII NEWS, June 5, 
2005, available at http://www.med.or.jp/nichinews/n170605a.html.  
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In sum, together with structural changes (discussed in Sections III and 
IV) that have affected the frequency of medical malpractice litigation, a 
variety of exogenous factors have contributed to (and been affected by) the 
rise in malpractice claims. A cycle has emerged in which more malpractice 
litigation triggers more media coverage of underperforming physicians; 
more media coverage negatively influences the public’s view of elites; and 
a lower regard for elites, combined with fewer barriers to litigation, 
contributes to the willingness of people to sue. The result is both an 
increase in the number of malpractice claims and a weakening of whatever 
normative barriers may have inhibited litigation. As structural 
impediments to litigation are lifted, cultural constraints are weakened as 
well, and what occurs is both a rise in litigation rates and a changed view 
of litigation. The relatively small number of medical malpractice claims 
suggests caution in using them as the basis for a broad claim about law 
and society in Japan. Nonetheless, if one views the trend in malpractice 
litigation as indicative of what is occurring in other areas of civil 
litigation—and the aggregate data reported by Tom Ginsburg and Glenn 
Hoetker offers some support for that view72—it appears that Japan is 
currently experiencing an important shift in the role of tort law in the lives 
of its citizens. 
VI. A NEW ERA OF JAPANESE TORT LAW: THE LURE OF THE COURTS  
It is easy to imagine the many ways in which Japanese legal and 
political elites could have utilized tried-and-true methods to ensure that 
patient complaints about substandard medical care would rarely end up in 
court. They could have raised filing fees; made hiring experts to testify 
about the standard of care more difficult; randomly assigned malpractice 
cases to judges with little experience handling technical medical matters, 
thus ensuring delay; created attractive alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms that were fast, cheap, and generous; placed tighter limits on 
damages; and more. One need not look far to find examples of state-
created barriers to tort-based litigation that channel potential litigants away 
from the courts toward extra-judicial forms of redress. Such alternative 
forums have been a favored way of handling conflict, and may well have 
been an effective way of handling the rise in malpractice lawsuits.73 
When the number of claims relating to automobile accidents began to 
escalate in the postwar era, for example, the government passed legislation 
 
 
 72. Ginsburg & Hoetker, supra note 12, at 36–37. 
 73. JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 40. 
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in 1955 that required all vehicle owners to carry a minimum level of 
insurance (thirty million yen by the early 1990s) and stipulated that the 
owners were liable for all damages unless they could prove that (1) they 
were not negligent; (2) a third party, or the accident victim, was negligent; 
and (3) the owner’s car was not defective. To collect, parties followed a 
finely grained procedure under which they consulted with a government 
traffic accident counselor, an insurance company representative, or a 
member of the bar association; the claim was evaluated; and payment was 
tendered. If parties were displeased with the settlement, they would go to a 
Traffic Accident Dispute Resolution Center. Claims over auto accidents 
ended up in court for two reasons—if complainants were unhappy about 
the settlement resolution, or if they initially demanded more of a payout 
than insurance would cover. In effect, the law channeled disputes through 
an administrative process that rejected the negligence standard and instead 
held vehicle owners strictly liable for auto accident-related harms. The 
result was a system in which most accident victims would recover, while 
imposing limited transaction costs and providing modest, capped damages. 
Disgruntled accident victims could always go to court and rely on 
traditional tort principles, but had to accept a significantly lower likelihood 
of recovery (and higher adjudication costs) than that enjoyed by holders of 
administratively processed claims. 
Disputes over environmental harms also illustrate how tort claims have 
been channeled away from the courts. In a series of cases brought to the 
courts in the 1960s and early 1970s, plaintiffs relied on tort law principles 
and achieved a number of significant political and legal victories. As a 
consequence, the government created an extrajudicial mechanism to divert 
cases from the courts. Under the 1973 Law for the Compensation of 
Pollution Related Health Injury,74 claimants can collect damages without 
proving a causal link between the existence of a pollutant and the 
emergence of health harms. In place of causation, claimants are permitted 
to show the administrators of the compensation fund (in the MHLW) that 
there is a statistical correlation between a particular disease and a 
particular type of pollution.75 The showing is based on epidemiological 
data that relieves claimants of the burden of proving specific causation so 
long as they can establish a general correlation between the discharge of 
the allegedly polluting substance and the outbreak of disease.76 As a result, 
 
 
 74. Kōgai Kenkō Higai no Hoshō ni Kansuru Hōritsu [Law for the Compensation of Pollution 
Related Health Injury], Law No. 111 of 1973. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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those who consider themselves victims of environmental pollution 
generally rely on non-tort rules and seek damages from the 
bureaucratically managed compensation system rather than through torts 
and courts. 
Auto accidents and environmental harms are hardly the only areas in 
which personal injury compensation has been diverted away from the 
courts.77 Although it is difficult to precisely identify the government’s 
motivations for creating extra-judicial, non-tort remedies for certain 
personal injuries, one can make certain observations about the 
consequences of such an approach. For one, it is clear that the reliance on 
extrajudicial approaches to personal harms has limited the number of cases 
brought to the courts and made the government a crucial actor in the 
processing and resolution of tort-related claims.78 In addition, 
administrative schemes in Japan have taken one of the goals of U.S. tort 
law—compensation—and made it the foundation of its system for 
managing accidental injuries. The U.S. experience, in contrast, has 
relatively few administrative compensation schemes, and litigation of 
personal injury claims is far more common. 
In the area of medical malpractice as well, extra-judicial dispute 
resolution and compensation, especially the Japan Medical Association’s 
(“JMA’s”) liability claims management system, has been used to manage 
injuries caused by malpractice.79 More than half of Japanese physicians are 
members of the JMA, and most of them purchase membership bundled 
with malpractice insurance.80 The JMA’s malpractice insurance is priced 
at less than one thousand dollars per year, regardless of practice area, and 
 
 
 77. Conflicts over injuries involving pharmaceutical products are another example. The seminal 
dispute in this area involved a group of people suffering from a neurological disorder called subacute 
myelo-optico neuropathy, or SMON. As a direct consequence of a Kanazawa District Court decision, 
in 1979 the Ministry of Health and Welfare created the Adverse Drug Reaction Fund (ADRF, also 
known as the Drug Side-Effects Injuries Relief and Research Promotion Fund Act, and as the Relief 
Fund for Injuries Caused by the Side Effects of Medicines), administered by the government but 
financed through contributions by the pharmaceutical industry. All claims are evaluated by a group 
that operates under the auspices of the Ministry, and payments cover medical expenses, nursing 
expenses, a living allowance, and a pension or a lump sum to surviving family members. By 1995, for 
example, 1714 thalidomide-related claims had been paid, for a total of 4.7 billion yen (over 40 million 
dollars). Other related funds, like that created by the Innoculation Act of 1948, amended in 1977, 
provide avenues of redress for children who suffer from the side effects of compulsory vaccination. 
 78. See FRANK UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987). 
 79. Japan’s approach differs from U.S.-style medical screening panels in numerous ways (the 
JMA process is started by a physician, the insurance company plays a central role, and screening 
occurs before cases are filed). See Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: 
Proposed Model Legislation to Cure Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 181 (1990).  
 80. Masakatsu Kōmi et al., (Shinpojyūmu) Iryō kago shoshō no shinri ni tsuite [Symposium 
Regarding Trials in Medical Malpractice], 1023 HANREI TIMES 6 (2000). 
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includes coverage of approximately one million dollars per year with a ten 
thousand dollar deductible.81 Physicians with JMA insurance who believe 
that they have harmed a patient as a result of malpractice can notify the 
local JMA office, which will investigate the incident and, in three to 
twelve months, either dismiss the claim or offer compensation. Payments 
are generally modest, with a largest recorded payment of $1.3 million. 
Since the JMA system is overseen by a mix of JMA officials and 
insurance company employees, there is no public reporting requirement 
and thus little available data on the frequency or typical disposition of 
claims.82 In fact, the system is only minimally publicized, and it is not 
clear how well informed patients are about its existence.  
The JMA’s extra-judicial dispute resolution mechanism has kept at 
least some cases away from the courts, thereby sidestepping the costs of 
litigation and providing compensation in certain relatively clear cases in 
which judges would be likely to find in favor of plaintiffs.83 One might 
have imagined that the government, cognizant of the rising number of 
malpractice suits, would have tried to build on the JMA system. Doing so 
may have enabled it to keep the courts out of the malpractice business, so 
that disgruntled patients would resolve their grievances in a less 
adversarial and public way. But that is not how the state responded. 
Instead, a patchwork of government initiatives—some targeted generally 
at better enabling the business community to resolve disputes through the 
courts, and others aimed specifically at medical malpractice litigation—
have made courts far more accessible and attractive to aggrieved patients 
than in the past. What this suggests, this Essay has argued, is a 
fundamental shift away from efforts to limit recourse to the courts—a shift 
that is both the result of and a continuing cause of new structural 
configurations and socio-political dispositions. No longer does the state 
 
 
 81. In contrast, the mean medical liability insurance premium in the United States in 2000 was 
$18,400, and for OB/GYN it was $39,200. ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004–2005, at 109. According to officials at Tokio 
Marine, Japan’s largest insurance carrier, the company makes little or no profit on malpractice 
insurance. Instead, such insurance is a loss leader, enabling the company to sell physicians other 
profitable insurance products, like home and auto insurance. In fact, the cost of insuring a typical 
Mercedes in Tokyo is ten times the cost of malpractice insurance. The JMA also supports low 
malpractice insurance rates, which it believes help to boost JMA membership.  
 82. The one published study of the JMA’s liability claims management system indicates that it 
handles four hundred claims per year, but this data is old and impossible to verify. See Nakajima et al., 
supra note 8, at 1637; NIHON ISHIKAI [JAPAN MEDICAL ASS’N], NIHON ISHIKAI ISHI BAISHOU SEKININ 
HOKEN [THE JAPAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION’S MEDICAL RESPONSIBILITY COMPENSATION 
INSURANCE] (2001). 
 83. The lack of juries in Japan and Japan’s professionalized judiciary make Japanese courts 
relatively more predictable than those in the United States. See Ramseyer, supra note 27, at 116–17.  
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simply slam the door on tort litigation by making courts particularly 
cumbersome and expensive. No longer do potential litigants face such 
daunting institutional barriers to suing that they have little choice but to 
resolve their claims through alternative channels. Instead, in the face of a 
rising tide of malpractice claims, the government has crafted a set of 
structural solutions that are at odds with its longstanding posture toward 
tort-based conflict. In doing so, it has eliminated many (but not all) of the 
impediments to using the courts to manage personal injury claims that 
have been the subject of so much attention from legal scholars.84  
Changes in the relationship between law and society, however, do not 
occur in a vacuum; they are responsive to, and indeed a product of, 
economic trends, political opportunities, and social values. This Essay has 
thus emphasized not only structural changes in Japanese civil litigation, 
but also the socio-political context of the changes surrounding the 
emergence and resolution of medical malpractice claims, particularly the 
growing negative perception of medical and other elites. Just as legal rules 
and procedures have reshaped Japan’s medical malpractice system, so too 
has the cultural context of that system been altered. It is difficult, perhaps 
impossible, to say whether changes in law triggered or trailed the broader 
social changes in which they are embedded. The more important 
observation is that the two are closely intertwined, and that a careful 
examination of conflicts over medical malpractice reveals their 
interdependence. 
Broad economic and political factors were crucial to laying the 
groundwork of legal reform. The 1990s were a period of economic malaise 
in Japan, and Prime Minister Koizumi staked much of his political capital 
on administrative, political, and legal reform. Indeed, the changes one 
observes in medical malpractice coincide with a more general embrace of 
legal reform.85 For almost a decade (and most powerfully since the late 
1990s), the banner of “shihō kaikaku” (legal/judicial reform) has been 
waved by the Ministry of Justice, Japanese Federation of Bar 
 
 
 84. There is of course nothing irreversible about this shift; old impediments to litigation may in 
the future be resuscitated or new ones could be created.  
 85. Just as one of Tokyo’s local city councils has promoted a new smoke-free sidewalks policy 
under the banner that social relations once structured by informal manners are now governed by formal 
rules (maná kara, rūru he), the government more generally has expended a tremendous amount of 
energy since the late 1990s promoting the idea that the rule of law needs to be strengthened and that 
people need to be legally empowered. It is difficult to measure the degree to which such rhetoric 
shapes consciousness, not to mention the degree to which this consciousness influences the willingness 
to litigate. But there is some empirical support for the claim that rates of litigation are increasing 
across the board, and the new rhetoric of legal reform at least suggests a greater willingness to portray 
litigation as a social good. 
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Associations, Ministry of Education, Secretariat of the Supreme Court, 
legal academics, and others, all of whom have come together on a variety 
of blue ribbon panels to propose and implement a wide array of changes to 
Japan’s legal system. Some have been targeted at specific areas of legal 
procedure, like the new Code of Civil Procedure; some have created laws 
where none had previously existed, such as the Freedom of Information 
Act and the law governing non-profit organizations; still others are aimed 
at the legal profession, particularly the restructuring of legal education. 
Medical malpractice litigation was hardly the prime mover of these many 
reforms, although it was important to some of them, like those involving 
the expert witness system. The high visibility of malpractice is the result 
of it becoming a “test case,” offering reformers an opportunity to publicly 
demonstrate the concrete impact of far-ranging (and often ambiguous) new 
legal institutions. For policymakers seeking evidence of their commitment 
to civil justice, for example, the acceleration of the resolution of medical 
malpractice trials offers a rough-and-ready guide. So the Japanese 
government’s new embrace of formal legal mechanisms is particularly 
visible in the area of medical malpractice, but it is surely not the only area 
of rapid change. 
It is tempting to observe the legal changes surrounding medical 
malpractice in Japan and conclude that they are yet another example of 
Japan’s alleged tendency to become more like the United States.86 In fact, 
at least some of the recent changes surrounding tort law and malpractice 
litigation in Japan do seem to provide some evidence of “convergence” 
with the United States and perhaps a more general “global” convergence. 
These include the reliance on the formal legal process as a reasonable 
venue for the airing and resolving of malpractice claims, the willingness to 
train more attorneys to represent parties in malpractice cases, and the 
experimentation with specialized courts and the expert witness system. On 
the other hand, significant differences remain between the tort systems of 
Japan and the United States (namely the possibility of high pain and 
suffering awards, the existence of punitive damages and true contingency 
fee billing, the availability of juries, and more), that sharply differentiate 
the management of medical malpractice claims in the United States from 
those filed in Japan.  
 
 
 86. Medical Malpractice Litigation in Gastroenterological Practice in Japan: A 22-Yr Review of 
Civil Court Cases, 101 AM. J. GASTROENTEROLOGY 1951, 1951 (2006) (“[T]he situation [regarding 
medical malpractice litigation] in Japan is gradually becoming more like that in the United States.”). 
See also R. Daniel Keleman & Eric C. Sibbitt, The Americanization of Japanese Law, 23 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 269 (2002).  
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The changes described in this Essay, therefore, ought not to be 
mistaken for what some have called the “Americanization” of Japanese 
law.87 There is no compelling evidence that the Japanese tort system is 
converging with the U.S. tort regime, and much to suggest that the area of 
medical malpractice in Japan is characterized by structural and social 
features that will continue to distinguish it from U.S.-style malpractice 
litigation. Instead, what is occurring in Japan is an example of the complex 
interplay of formal legal rules and procedures with economic, political, 
and social factors that frame their existence, creating a symbiotic 
relationship in which structure and culture affect and are affected by each 
other. The results are a shift in the importance of tort law and a changed 
social context in which it operates. As the legal rules and procedures 
governing medical malpractice claims change, so too does the society in 
which they are embedded, laying the foundation for yet another stage in 
the long relationship between tort law and society. 
 
 
 87. See, e.g., Keleman & Sibbitt, supra note 86. A somewhat stronger case can be made that 
malpractice law in Japan has become increasingly similar to that in Canada and the U.K., where pain 
and suffering awards are lower than in the United States, punitive damages and juries are uncommon, 
and contingency fees are of recent origin. 
 
